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Abstract
Over the last decade there have been great strides made in developing techniques to compute functions
privately. In particular, Differential Privacy gives strong promises about conclusions that can be drawn
about an individual. In contrast, various syntactic methods for providing privacy (criteria such as k-
anonymity and l-diversity) have been criticized for still allowing private information of an individual to
be inferred.
In this report, we consider the ability of an attacker to use data meeting privacy definitions to build
an accurate classifier. We demonstrate that even under Differential Privacy, such classifiers can be used to
accurately infer “private” attributes in realistic data. We compare this to similar approaches for inference-
based attacks on other forms of anonymized data. We place these attacks on the same scale, and observe
that the accuracy of inference of private attributes for Differentially Private data and l-diverse data can be
quite similar.
1 Introduction
Anonymization and privacy has occupied the computer science research community for over a decade
now (with efforts in statistics going back further). Initial efforts focused on trying to modify microdata,
via reducing the precision of data (coarsening values, forming tuples into groups). These generally tried
to achieve syntactic requirements: famously, k-anonymization [17], and subsequently an alphabet soup of
further definitions (l-diversity [15], t-closeness [14], and so on). However, various attacks have been shown
on these models which reduced confidence in their suitability for data release. In this case, a successful
attack has been defined (de facto) as an analysis of the released data which allows an observer to make
guesses as to a particular attribute of a tuple which are correct with probability larger than is intended by
the anonymizer [19, 8, 13].
In parallel, a more principled approach to privacy has arisen, in the form of differential privacy [6].
In its simplest form, differential privacy releases statistics, by computing the exact value of the statistic,
and then adding random noise. The random noise is chosen so that the influence of any individual on the
statistic is masked by the noise. This leads to the observation that it is safe to provide one’s personal data to
a mechanism implementing differential privacy, since the conclusions that can be drawn are (broadly) the
same, irrespective of whether or not one’s data is collected. Consequently, differential privacy has started
to be adopted as a ‘gold standard’ of privacy, and is becoming widely used.
In this paper, we study an attack on differential privacy, in the sense described above: it is possible to
infer information about an individual with non-trivial accuracy. This does not violate any of the (proven)
properties of differential privacy. It leads to the seeming contradiction that regardless of whether an in-
dividual contributes or withholds their data to a study (or reports false data), we can nevertheless use
observable information about them to infer their private information. The attack is ultimately quite simple,
and can be executed with minimal computational effort.
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2 Differential Privacy
2.1 The Model
We adopt the canonical model of data from the initial work on anonymization: the input is a table of
tuples T , and each tuple t ∈ T corresponds to an individual. There is one distinguished attribute which is
considered ‘sensitive’ (stereotypically, a disease suffered by the individual, or their salary band, say). The
remaining attributes are considered partially identifying: demographic information about the individual,
such as their age, gender, approximate location, ethnicity and so on. These are referred to in the literature
as quasi-identifiers. Separately, each attribute value applies to a large number of individuals in the data,
but taken collectively they are often sufficient to uniquely identify an individual [10].
For syntactic approaches to anonymization, the objective is to modify the input data by various oper-
ations so that it achieves a given property. The modifications may be to coarsen attributes (replace exact
birth date by only year of birth), suppress some attributes entirely, or form tuples into groups and separate
the multiset of sensitive values corresponding to each group. In most prior work, the effect of the data
modification results in groups of tuples. The goal may be to ensure that each group has at least k members
(k anonymity [17]); each group has at most a 1/l fraction of tuples with the same sensitive attribute value
(simplified l-diversity [15]); and so on.
The differential privacy approach is different, in that it does not explicitly publish microdata. Instead, a
query is posed on the data to the data owner. The data owner computes the exact answer of the query, then
perturbs the answer by adding appropriate statistical noise. We focus on the core case when all queries
are simply a collection of count queries: to count the number of individuals in the data who satisfy certain
predicates. Further, we consider the case where there is only a single round of querying (asking for various
counts): there is no adaptive querying in response to previous results. In the literature, these are known
as histogram queries or contingency tables and the formula for amount of noise is straightforward [2].
Note that it is trivial to implement this in a publishing model, when the data owner chooses a collection of
statistics to publish, and applies the differential privacy mechanism.
For a given query q, we must compute its sensitivity sq , which is the maximum influence that any indi-
vidual can have on the answer vector. The influence is measured under the L1 norm. Given a parameter ,
the data owner computes the vector of answers and adds iid noise to each entry. This noise may be drawn
from a (continuous) Laplacian with parameter sq/, or from a (discrete) symmetric geometric distribution
with parameter α = exp(−/sq) [9]. This guarantees that, for any individual, the probability of any prop-
erty holding on the output of the algorithm is within a multiplicative factor of at most exp() of the same
property holding on the dataset with that individual’s data omitted. Less formally, the intent of this defi-
nition is that even with substantial knowledge about other individuals in the data, it is still hard to deduce
any property of a targeted individual.
Dalenius provided an oft-quoted definition of disclosure resulting from data release: “If the release of
the statistic S makes it possible to determine the (microdata) value more accurately than without access to
S, a disclosure has taken place...” [5]. Following this definition, we define an attack on anonymized data
as, given a target individual, to try to discover their sensitive value. More precisely, given access to the
output of the anonymization process, and some knowledge about a targeted individual such as their easily
observable characteristics (age, sex, ethnicity: quasi-identifiers), to infer their associated sensitive value.
This has been formalized in the literature as attribute (non-)privacy [12]: This definition applies to the
earliest linking attack of Sweeney on de-identified data [18]; the homogeneity attack on k-anonymous data
[15]; the minimality attack, which conditions on knowledge of the algorithm used to create the anonymized
data [19]; and the deFinetti attack (discussed in greater detail in Section 3) [13]. All these attacks demon-
strate disclosure, in the sense used by Dalenius. The success of the attack may be characterized by its
accuracy: the fraction of input tuples for which the attack gives the correct value. Clearly, this probability
will vary as a function of the data, and of parameters of the anonymization.
2.2 Accurate Differentially Private Classifiers
In line with previous attacks on privacy [13, 3], we describe a method to build an accurate classifier which,
given the quasi-identifier of an individual, predicts their sensitive attribute. For simplicity, we initially
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assume that all attributes in the data are categoric and of relatively low cardinality, and later discuss this
assumption.
Many classifiers have been proposed in the machine learning literature, but the simplest is the Naive
Bayes classifier (NB). We will build an NB classifier which aims to predict the SA value given the evidence
of QI values of an individual. On an unanonymized data table T , the classifier is built by computing the
conditional distributions of each attribute given the target value s, i.e. Pr[ti|s] for each of the m QI values,
ti. The prediction for the tuple t of QI values is given by1
sˆ(t) = arg max
s∈SA
Pr[s]
m∏
i=1
Pr[ti|s]
Observe that the parameters of this classifier are easy to learn: given a tuple r, ri is its ith component,
and rs is its sensitive value. Then we use
Pr[ti|s] = Pr[ti ∩ s]
Pr[s]
≈ |{r ∈ T : ri = ti ∩ rs = s}||{r ∈ T : rs = s|}
That is, to build the classifier, we need the counts of values present in T i, the ith column of table T :
∀s ∈ SA, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, v ∈ T i : |{r ∈ T : ri = v ∩ rs = s}| (1)
and ∀s ∈ SA : |{r ∈ T : rs = s}|
from which we can derive the required conditional probabilities.2
Observe that the sensitivity of this query is actually quite low: although there are a moderate number
of parameters, the influence that any tuple can have on the answer vector is m + 1: each individual is
counted in at most m joint distributions, plus the marginal distribution of SA values. This is exactly the
approach proposed in work on releasing histograms and contingency tables [2]. Thus the attack proceeds
by requesting all counts listed in (1). Some small corrections are required: first, the noise may cause some
counts to become negative. These can simply be adjusted up to the smallest feasible value, i.e. 0. Secondly,
due to the noise, we do not have that the sum of the counts for attribute i with SA value s is certain to equal
the marginal count of s. We remedy this by simply defining
Pr[ti|s] := 1 + max(0, |{r ∈ T : ri = ti ∩ rs = s}|)∑
t∈Ti 1 + max(0, |{r ∈ T : ri = t ∩ rs = s}|)
.
Here, the addition of 1 is the standard Laplacian correction. Further, we can use
Pr[s] =
∑m
i=1
∑
t∈Ti 1 + max(0, |{r ∈ T : ri = t ∩ rs = s}|)∑
s′∈SA
∑m
i=1
∑
t∈Ti 1 + max(0, |{r ∈ T : ri = t ∩ rs = s′}|)
and therefore reduce the sensitivity of the query from m+ 1 to m.
This “naive attack” is therefore trying to emulate the corresponding classifier built with exact counts.
So we do not expect the attack to predict values better than this noiseless classifier. Rather, the question
is to what extent does the noise introduced by differential privacy degrade the accuracy of the classifier.
Historically, Naive Bayes has been shown to get tolerable accuracy (when compared to other classification
methods) with a moderate number of attributes, in the range m = 3–10, say. The sensitivity, also m, is
therefore quite low: for settings of  in the range 1.0 to 0.1, the absolute value of the noise introduced to
counts is in the single to double digit range. While this is enough to mask the contribution of any individual,
the crucial issue is that for a large enough dataset (|T |), the effect on the derived conditional probabilities
is still relatively small, and thus the classifier learns approximately the same correlations. Therefore, even
while a single individual is dominated by the noise, the noise is in turn dominated by the signal emerging
from the whole population.
1This can be normalized so that assignment over different s values is a probability distribution.
2More correctly, we can draw the parameters for the classifier from a Dirichlet distribution given the observed counts.
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Figure 1: Naive attack on adult data set
2.3 Experimental Study
We implemented a proof-of-concept version of the “naive attack” in Python. We pick two data sets contain-
ing demographic data: the ‘Adult’ and ‘Internet’ data sets from the UCI Machine Learning repository [1].
The adult data set contains multiple attributes from a census-like survey of adults, while Internet contains
details of a survey on Internet usage in 1997. From the adult data set, we selected the attributes workclass,
level of education completed, occupation, sex, hours worked per week, and the binary attribute on whether
income exceeds $50K. We bucketized hours worked per week into [0–25], [26–40], [41–60] and 60+. After
removing tuples with missing sensitive values, there are a total of 30718 tuples in the adult data set. For the
Internet data set, we selected the attributes age (treated as categoric but not bucketized), country, education
level, gender, occupation, marital status and household income. Income is provided bucketed into ranges
$10-20K, $20-30K, $30-40K, $40-50K, $50-75K, $75-100K, over $100K, below $10K, and ‘not given’. There are
a total of 10108 tuples in the Internet data set. In neither case did we remove tuples with missing QI values,
since the classifier is relatively robust to their presence.
Our classifier was implemented to generate conditional probabilities given counts with geometric noise
added as a function of the parameter . We evaluated the accuracy of the classifier by then providing
the quasi-identifiers of each input tuple in turn, and counting the fraction for which the correct sensitive
attribute was guessed (based on taking the value deemed most likely by the classifier).
Figure 1 shows the accuracy of the naive attack (fraction of correct predictions) as  is varied. We plot
the accuracy when the sensitive attribute is ‘occupation’ (Figure 1(a)) and when it is ‘marital status’ (the
same attributes are targeted in prior work on attacks [3, 13]). Note that there are fourteen categories of
occupation in the data, and the trivial method which simply predicts the most frequent occupation achieves
13% accuracy. There are seven categories of marital status, and the most common occurs 45% of the time.
The classifier is quite successful at learning the target attribute: the plot shows the minimum, maximum and
mean accuracy across nine independent iterations (over different draws of the noise on the count queries).
When  is high, effectively no noise is being added, so the rightmost points are essentially the result of
applying this classifier on the original data. As  is decreased, the accuracy reduces gradually, despite more
noise being added. Prior work on differential privacy has used values of  in the range  = 0.1 . . . 1. Even
at  = 0.01, the attack achieves a non-trivial accuracy.
The plots in Figure 1(a) show the accuracy evaluated over two data sets. On the ‘training data’, we train
the classifier on (noisy) counts, and then evaluate its accuracy on the same training data. On the ‘test data’,
we evaluate the same classifier on a withheld test data set. This shows that the classifier is about as accurate
on the withheld data as on the training data.
Figure 2 shows a similar experiment on the Internet usage data set, for the targets of household income
and occupation (Figures 2(a) and 2(b) respectively). Income has nine distinct values, the most frequent of
which occurs 18% of the time; Occupation has five distinct values, and the most frequent occurs 23% of the
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Figure 2: Naive attack on Internet data set
time. There is a similar trend: the noiseless classifier is quite accurate, and increasing the amount of noise
gradually reduces this accuracy.
Note that the classifier’s output on each tuple can be interpreted as a probability distribution over sen-
sitive values. Thus we can focus on those tuples for which the classifier places more of its weight on a
particular outcome. Figure 3 shows the accuracy (summarizing nine separate, independent repetitions)
when restricted to only those tuples for which the classifier’s belief is greater than 0.8. They show that on
these tuples, the classifier is indeed quite accurate. In the adult data set, there are a few hundred such tuples
on average (around 1% of the data) when the target is occupation, and over 8000 (25%) for marital status.
For occupation on the Internet data, there are around 1700 high confidence tuples (17%), and 300 (3%) for
income. In other words, there is an appreciable minority of tuples on which the classifier is more confident,
and justifiably so: reaching 85% accuracy on this subset in some cases.
Note that the classifier is quite lightweight to implement. The time to load the data, compute the re-
quired counts, add the noise, and apply the classifier to the collection of QI values was about 1 second on
the Internet data (10K tuples) and 3 seconds on the adult dataset (32K tuples).
2.4 Discussion
The experiments show that this “attack” can be quite effective: we can learn supposedly private information
of an individual with reasonable accuracy. In other words, even under differential privacy, disclosure can
take place, in the sense used by Dalenius. Does this contradict the claims for differential privacy? No, in
fact it is quite in line with the guarantees of differential privacy. These promise (informally) that what we
can learn from the differentially private data is broadly the same, whether or not any individual contributes
their true information, false information, or withholds their information entirely.
This is respected by the attack: rather than directly learning properties of an individual, it is learning
properties of a population. The model we learn of the whole population is largely unaffected by any in-
dividual’s data. However, the potential privacy issue is that this population model is quite accurate at
predicting private information at the individual level, given an honest cooperative majority. This is seen
most clearly in the experimental study: the classifier is about as accurate on the ‘test set’. The test set con-
tains individuals who never contributed any information about themselves to building the classifier, yet
because they sufficiently resemble the training set, we can still predict their private information.
In fact, this consequence is in some ways anticipated by previous negative results on the possibility of
privacy against sufficiently powerful attackers. Dwork [7] illustrates this with the example of an attacker
who knows that “Terry Gross is two inches shorter than the average Lithuanian woman”: the attacker can
learn the average height of the Lithuanian population with high accuracy from a large survey of Lithuani-
ans, and hence learn the individual height of Terry Gross. This example is perhaps easy to dismiss, due to
the relative innocuousness of learning anyone’s height, and the apparent absurdity of somehow knowing
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Figure 3: Naive attack restricted to high confidence predictions
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the connection between an individual’s height and that of an East European nation. Yet, in our setting,
if we replace this knowledge by the assumption that “Terry Gross’ (private) height is correlated with her
(observable) age, sex, ethnicity etc., in much the same way as for the population in this survey”, then the
attack becomes much more plausible. The key differences are that the knowledge of an obscure fact is re-
placed with a reasonable assumption, and the correlation can be easily learned from data which meets the
differential privacy requirement.
One may still question whether learning about an individual when they never reveal their private data
to anyone is truly an attack in the spirit of the term. We argue that an attack is in the eye of the beholder:
if an attacker now believes that they know an individual’s private information with high confidence, then
he too is indifferent as to whether the victim contributed to the study which enabled the inference. This
is exactly captured by Dalenius’ notion of disclosure: this inference would not have been possible without
the release of information. Consider the case of a multi-year, many-participant, multi-million dollar genetic
study: the attacker would not go to this effort to create the necessary classifier, but can build one from
the released statistics for free. The core issue is that latent properties of a population, when learned, can
compromise the privacy of an individual. This example has showed that this is not an academic concern,
but can be instantiated easily and cheaply on typical data.
2.5 Variations
Choice of Attributes. In general, adding more attributes to a Naive Bayes classifier improves its accuracy.
However, in our setting, each extra attribute increases the sensitivity of the query required, increasing
the noise introduced. There is therefore a delicate tradeoff: the increase in classifier accuracy from the
increased knowledge of correlations, against the loss in accuracy due to more noise. We leave more detailed
discussion of this aspect for future study.
Continuous attributes. Naive Bayes is less effective when treating continuous attributes (such as height in
millimetres) as categoric: there is too little evidence for any fixed value to accurately learn the underlying
correlation. There are two natural fixes: the first is to model the distribution as, e.g., a Gaussian, and
to learn the parameters of the distribution (mean, variance) via appropriate count queries (which remain
low sensitivity). The second is to ‘bucketize’ the attribute based on some natural bucketing scheme to
make it categoric: group height into 10cm intervals, for example. This places together values which are
semantically similar, so that appropriate correlations can still be determined. The same approach works
when an attribute is categoric but has very high cardinality: domain-aware bucketing or coarsening can
ensure that each count is sufficiently large to be unaffected by the noise. For example, location data at the
street level might be coarsened to the town, state or country level, depending on the detail of the data. We
assume that the adversary is able to request data according to the bucketing of their choice.
Other Classifier Choices. We focus on Naive Bayes due to its simplicity, the relatively small number of
parameters and the minimal modeling skill needed in its use. Moreover, it is successful in this case because
it has a low sensitivity. Naturally, one can also consider other classifiers. A first step is to consider higher-
degree correlations: we can remove independence assumptions, e.g., by replacing separate factors of sex
and age-range with the joint distribution of sex and age-range conditioned on the SA. This further reduces
the sensitivity of the query (and hence the noise), but needs to be approached with care: just as in traditional
Naive Bayes, partitioning up the space may lead to too few examples in each category. In our setting, this
is further worsened since it increases the relative amount of noise added to each count.
More generally, other classifiers can be built. Indeed, there has been much prior work discussing the
suitability of differential privacy for accurate learning [16, 11].3 The chief concern is to consider the sen-
sitivity of the classifier: extending to Bayesian networks does not substantially alter the sensitivity, which
depends only on the number of nodes in the network. Various regression models also have low sensitivity.
On the other hand, building a large number of random decision trees has high sensitivity, and requires the
data owner to respond interactively to many queries as the classifier determines where to split each node.
3In particular, McSherry and Mironov point to the potential for accurate personalized predictions to compromise the privacy of an
individual [16].
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3 Comparison to the deFinetti Attack
The attack described is inspired by the deFinetti attack on syntactically anonymized data, introduced by
Kifer [13]. The goal of the deFinetti attack is to build a classifier that, given the quasi-identifiers of a tuple
in a group, is able to predict the corresponding sensitive attribute value. In other words, the approach and
goal of the deFinetti attack is the same as the above naive attack. Moreover, the instantiation of the attack
was also done based on Naive Bayes as the classifier, and the same dataset, meaning that we can compare
the methods in more detail.
3.1 The deFinetti Attack
We now briefly summarize the attack. As in the previous study, we fix the method used to anonymize data
as Anatomy, and the classifier as Naive Bayes, with the understanding that both of these can be replaced
by other methods.
Anatomy is a grouping-based anonymization method [20]. Given a parameter l, it partitions the input
data of size n into groups of size l (or l+1 when l does not divide n), such that in each group there is at most
one tuple for any given SA value. The published version of the data therefore includes the multiset of QIs
in each group, and the multiset of SAs in each group, but withholds the exact mapping between them. The
intent is therefore that a simplistic adversary should believe that any given QI in the group has a uniform
chance of being associated with any particular SA in the same group, and thus bounds their belief in any
association by at most 1/l.
Kifer’s observation is that there is sufficient correlation in the published group data that a more sophisti-
cated adversary can learn a better set of beliefs (in the form of a classifier). The attack proceeds by guessing
an initial random permutation for each group to map each QI value to one SA value. This induces a set
of conditional distributions over each quasi-identifier value given a sensitive attribute value, which de-
scribes a Naive Bayes classifier. Indeed, this view is present in prior work: Brickell and Shmatikov describe
essentially this first step in an earlier paper [3].
The deFinetti attack goes further by using the classifier (built from global information) to assess the
relative likelihood of the current permutation in each group locally. One can then sample other possible
permutations, and decide to adopt them in place of the current permutation: deterministically so if they are
deemed more likely, and randomly so if they are less likely The likelihoods are determined by the current
classifier. By iterating this process over many steps, the expectation is that the process converges to an
accurate classifier.
The classifier can be used in conjunction with information from the anonymized data to make predic-
tions. As originally described, given a QI value within a specific group, its predicted SA value can be that
assigned to it based on the current permutation (or a history of recent assignments). This is the version
described by Kifer [13], which we refer to as the ‘permutation’ method. Alternately, we can apply the clas-
sifier to the group, conditioned on the knowledge that the true SA is one of the l possibilities. This we refer
to as the ‘group’ method. Lastly, we can simply use the QI values to predict the SA value without explicit
knowledge of the group structure, which we refer to as the ‘open’ method. Note that this last method
should never be appreciably better than the NB classifier built from the original, noiseless data.
3.2 Experimental Study
The original study of the deFinetti attack presented experiments with relatively small values of l (2,3,4) on
the Adult data set. Starting from Kifer’s original implementation, we extended the method to study its
accuracy on larger group sizes, and under the additional accuracy measures (group and free, in addition to
permutation). We describe our results for the same target, the ‘occupation’ attribute of the Adult data set.
We perform a thousand iterations of the learning process: analyzing the accuracy of the classifier and the
L1 norm between subsequent joint distributions confirms that this is sufficiently many steps for the process
to almost converge in most cases. We perform five repetitions of each experiments, and plot the max, min
and average accuracy of each of the three methods to predict SA values (permutation, group and open).
Figure 4 shows the effects of the attack for different choices of the parameter l. Note that l = 7 is the
upper limit, since there is one occupation with occurs just below 1/7 of the time. Figure 4(a) shows that
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Figure 4: deFinetti attack on adult-occupation
our results agree with those reported in [13] for l = 2, 3, 4: in fact they show the attack to be more effective
due to including tuples with missing QI values (giving more evidence), and choosing a slightly different
set of QI attributes (giving a stronger classifier). The observation is that accuracy is clearly better than the
trivial bound of 1/l when the adversary simply applies a uniform prior over all permutations from QI to
SA values in each group, and does not attempt to learn a better classifier. Nevertheless, the trend is for the
accuracy to decrease as l increases.
The plot shows that the attack requires locating a target tuple within the published data in order to be
truly effective. That is, without applying a constraint to the sensitive attribute, the ‘open’ approach, the
accuracy is never better than the corresponding classifier trained on the true counts (see Figure 1(a), for a
large  value). Only when the attacker can guarantee finding the target tuple uniquely in the published
data can he achieve the higher accuracy via the group or permutation method. For small groups, the
permutation method (which conditions on other tuples in the same group) is slightly more accurate, but
when the group grows large enough, the group method (which only predicts via the target tuple) becomes
more accurate.
While the accuracy in all cases far exceeds 1/l, at a group size of 7, the impact of the attack is less than
that of the naive attack on differential privacy: the accuracy falls below 30%. This implies that the impact
of the attack can be reduced by increasing group sizes. This is shown further in Figure 4(b). Here, we take
the data output of Anatomy and merge together pairs of adjacent groups. The resulting output remains
l-diverse, but groups now contain 2l tuples. Again, the accuracy exceeds 1/l, but by a lower amount, and it
falls below that of the noiseless classifier for l = 5 (group size 10). The permutation method is more clearly
dominated by the group method, but both become close to the open method for larger groups. Increasing
the size of the groups further decreases the ability of the classifier: when we merge together three groups
(not shown), the permutation method degrades to about 1/l accuracy.
Similar results are seen on other data sets. Figure 5 shows the results on the Internet data set with ‘in-
come’ as the SA value. Again, the open approach is never better than the noiseless classifier, and degrades
as the group size increases. Being able to identify the target tuple within a group increases the accuracy
above 1/l, although this falls as the group size increases. Merging groups together further reduces the
power of the attack: Figure 5(b) shows that the accuracy is the same as that of the noiseless classifier (see
Figure 2(a)) when l reaches 4. In larger groups (merging three groups into one), the accuracy is below 1/l.
As in the Differential Privacy case, we can focus in on those predictions in which the classifier places the
highest confidence. We omit full details for brevity, but observe that there are similar trends: under the
‘goup’ definition, on small groups the attack has an appreciable number of individuals with high confi-
dence predictions, which are indeed correct more often than for the rest of the population. As the group
size is increased, the number of high confidence predictions dwindles, and the average accuract falls back
to the global level.
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Figure 5: deFinetti attack on Internet-income
3.3 deFinetti and Differential Privacy
Since its introduction, the deFinetti attack has been seen by some as the “last nail in the coffin” of syntactic
privacy methods, and used to argue that only differentially private methods should be considered. Cer-
tainly, the attack can be potent when applied to data published with very small values the parameter l and
small groups. However, prior work on anonymization has typically used somewhat larger parameters: l in
the range 6-10 at least, and group sizes of 10-100 for higher security. In these situations, the attack loses its
power: its accuracy reduces to 1/l (or worse), the same as simply guessing a value for each tuple uniformly
from those in the group. Focusing only on privacy, it seems that the impact of the attack can be mitigated.
Moreover, the deFinetti attack is directly comparable to the above naive attack on differential privacy.
Both model the data in the same way, target the same goal and attempt to build the same classifier to
predict private information. Most of the effort in the deFinetti attack is expended in building the model
of the population, which is trivial under differential privacy. Actually applying the classifier is then quite
cheap in comparison.
The potential for the deFinetti attack to reveal more comes from additionally being able to condition on
the limited set of possibilities within a group to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of possible values for a
given tuple. That is, the ‘open’ method is (roughly) the accuracy from using properties of the population
alone, and the additional power of group/perm comes from the additional information presented by the
published data. This is impactful for small group sizes, but the advantage seems to be substantially dimin-
ished for larger groups sizes. For certain settings of parameters, differential privacy can be more susceptible
to attack than the corresponding syntactic anonymization: the accuracy of the model of the population
built in the latter case less than in the former case. Thus neither approach is immune to the possibility of
attacking via building accurate classifiers.
Of course, syntactic anonymization is subject to other criticisms and attacks. But rejecting all such
anonymizations because the deFinetti attack exists is erroneous: by the same logic, we should also aban-
don differential privacy as well. Rather, we need to consider more nuanced threat models: against what
adversary do we require the anonymized data to withstand? This should differ depending on whether
we are sharing anonymized data with a colleague in another department or releasing a data set publicly
on the web. Depending on the perceived threats, and the consequences of a successful attack, it may be
appropriate to use deidentification, syntactic privacy, differential privacy, or to withhold release entirely.
4 Discussion
The core issue highlighted here is that coarse properties of the population taken together quickly combine to
build a model that can be applied to individuals with high accuracy. Existing anonymization methods tend
to ignore this issue, and prior work has brushed this aside, assuming that such correlations can be ignored,
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or are known to all data users already. However, this is not sufficient: in reality, release of (anonymized)
data may reveal hitherto unknown population parameters which compromise individual privacy. It seems
unlikely that future efforts can satisfactorily resolve this issue, since in some settings, these populations
statistics may represent exactly the desired utility of the data collection and publication. For example, the
results of scientific studies are frequently parlayed to the public in the form of simple conditional proba-
bilities (“drinking two glasses of wine each day reduces the chance of heart disease by 50%”, say). Using
such information for individuals to apply them to their own behavior, and modify it accordingly, is seen
as a potential benefit of such studies. Meanwhile, the use of such information by a healthcare provider to
prioritize patients for treatment may be seen as less desirable for the same individual.
To what extent should the attacks discussed in this paper chill our enthusiasm for differential privacy,
or anonymization in general? In part, this depends on how severely we view the disclosure resulting from
the attack. Here, the choice of terminology becomes an issue. The term “attack” has been inherited by the
privacy world from the area of security. In security, an “attack” is typically understood to be a mechanism
which compromises a supposedly secure system and permits access to the system or information within
it. For example, a successful attack on an encrypted message typically reveals the cleartext content of the
message to the attacker. Critically, our expectation is that a successful instance of an attack on security
correctly indicates that it has indeed succeeded: the revealed message is determined to be the message that
was sent.
For initial attacks on anonymization systems, it was clear that disclosure had occurred: Sweeney was
sure that she had identified the health records belonging to the Governor of Massachusetts [18]. Subsequent
attacks are more probabilistic in nature: the minimality attack (as introduced in [19] and analyzed in [4]) and
the deFinetti attack [13] give an elevated belief in the association between a private value and an individual,
but they do not provide certainty. Although we can empirically determine that these attacks are correct in
associating an individual with their true value a large fraction of the time, they do not help to indicate with
certainty for which individuals this is a true inference, and for which it is a false positive. The same is true
of the naive attack we describe here: the classifier is often right, but we are never fully sure when.
For such probabilistic attacks, we must therefore decide what level of belief we can tolerate. This is
naturally a function of the sensitivity of the information being inferred, and the way in which it is being
used. For example, a blackmailer threatening to reveal a target’s true sexuality to their family can perhaps
tolerate making a few false accusations before finding a victim, while a law enforcement organization might
require a much higher degree of suspicion before being granted a warrant to investigate further. Note
however, as has been elaborated elsewhere, proceeding with an incorrect belief about an individual can be
just as damaging to them as a correct belief (e.g. leading to denial of insurance coverage).
Clearly, there are many questions remaining over the use of data and its privacy-respecting dissemina-
tion. However, one message from this study is that it is not sufficient to naively apply differential privacy
to data, and assume that this is sufficient to address all privacy concerns. Instead, much more careful
deliberation about the consequences of the data release is needed.
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